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Abstract
Woodford (1999 and 2003) has raised the theoretical possibility that in a
standard, forward looking sticky price model, an independent channel of inertia
might arise as a result of policy behavior. We analyze this assertion empirically,
and estimate a standard model, in which the monetary authority is assumed
to commit to an optimal rule. We contribute to the existing literature by iden-
tifying the purely policy induced persistence present in the model. We also
analyze the role of the structural parameters reﬂecting policy preferences and
price ﬂexibility in altering the policy induced, as well as the overall persistence
properties of the model. We ﬁnd that such a model is able to replicate most of
the data’s moments. In constrast to previous empirical literature, lagged terms
in both modelled Phillips and IS curves are found to be either insigniﬁcant or
very small. Commitment policy alone can explain a substantial part of out-
put persistence. While the pricing mechanism at the heart of this model helps
transfer output persistence into inﬂation persistence, commitment policy man-
ages to undo this link by undershooting the inﬂation target following a positive
‘cost push’ shock so that inﬂation persistence is slightly reduced compared to
the discretionary policy case.
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11 Introduction
In two important contributions, Chari, Kehoe and Mc Grattan (2000) and Huang
and Liu (2002) conclude that the sticky price mechanism at the heart of recent New
Keynesian macromodels is hardly able to generate any persistence beyond the exoge-
nously assumed period of price stickiness. For reasonable parameter values used to
calibrate their model, they demonstrate that monetary shocks have a limited eﬀect
on output in both impact and duration. Importantly, the Phillips curve underlying
these models implies that the persistence properties of inﬂation stem mainly from
that of marginal cost. Since output is one of marginal cost’s main component, ob-
served persistence in inﬂation could then hardly be explained by such models. This
result has led researchers to look at mechanisms which could emphasize additional
channels through which more persistent responses to monetary shocks might arise.
In addressing this issue, some studies have emphasized labour market frictions. The
idea backing these studies is to reduce the sensitivity of real marginal costs to output
ﬂuctuations.1
The general equilibrium literature cited above explores the impact of random pol-
icy shocks i.e. the unsystematic component of central bank’s actions and its role
in aﬀecting the dynamic properties of inﬂation and output. However, as McCallum
(1999a) convincingly argues, random monetary shocks account for a very small frac-
tion of total policy instrument variability (with respect to the variability induced
by systematic policy behavior). Indeed, it is likely that monetary policy behavior
is hardly aﬀected by an unsystematic component. Even more importantly, the way
given shocks aﬀect the economy is in general closely linked to the systematic be-
havior of the monetary authorities. In accordance with this view, a recent strand
of literature has integrated endogenous policy making in this class of models. For
example, the central bank optimizes its response to shocks on a day to day basis or
chooses to behave according to an instrument rule, whereby it evaluates the current
and possible future state of the economy and chooses to act accordingly (usually by
choosing the short term interest rate as its instrument).2 Such studies have also gen-
erally been confronted with the diﬃculties inherent to purely forward looking models
in explaining the persistence in the data; they have consequently either added lagged
terms in the equations reﬂecting private agent’s decision rules, or assumed an inertial
central bank objective to start with (i.e. an interest rate smoothing objective). The
so-called backward looking behavior in private agent’s decision rules is still a matter
of considerable debate and this essay tries to shed some light on this issue. In an
early theoretical analysis, Woodford (1999) has shown that the central bank might
1 For example, Huang and Liu (2002) show that wage staggering is better at producing per-
sistence. Christiano et al. (2001) conﬁrm this result and show furthermore that the contribution
of price staggering to overall persistence is very poor, so that assuming wage staggering performs
nearly as well as when both staggering mechanisms are assumed.
2Typical instrument rules have mainly focused on the so called ‘Taylor rule’.
2be willing to optimally induce some inertia. If the central bank is precommited to a
rule, its decision procedure will aﬀect present and future private sector expectations.
However, given the current state of the economy, an optimal plan will typically not
allow the central bank’s current decisions to depend exclusively on future events.
Rather, as Woodford (2003) clearly puts it:
“Optimal policy must take account of the advantages of the anticipation of the
policy at earlier dates; and for this reason it must generally be history dependent
rather than purely forward looking. Past conditions should be taken into account in
choosing the current policy setting, because it is desirable that people be able, at the
earlier time, to count on the fact that the central bank will subsequently do so.”
Accordingly, it is optimal for the monetary authority to respond to both con-
temporaneous and lagged shocks aﬀecting the economy. This behavior will in turn
introduce an additional and independent channel of inertia. In light of all this, it is
quite surprising how little work has sought to analyze empirically this type of optimal
policy rule in a standard New Keynesian model. We argue that a commitment to a
policy rule might be a good approximation of central bank behavior when the period
of analysis reﬂects a stable and credible policy regime. Since our benchmark economy
is purely forward looking, the only assumed inherent source of persistence resulting
from private sector behavior arises from serially correlated shocks to the economy.
More precisely, we assume serially correlated preference and money demand shocks
on the demand side and serially correlated ‘cost push’ shocks on the supply side. Such
a choice is motivated by our willingness to focus on the role of monetary policy in
generating persistence, without specifying any deﬁnite form of persistence that would
initially arise from private sector behavior or decisions.3 Importantly, as shown by
Steinsson (2003) and Ireland (2004), the presence of supply shocks can be derived
from the model’s microfoundations.
Our main goal is to identify and isolate the role of monetary policy in aﬀecting the
dynamics of endogenous variables. In a relevant time period, we estimate the standard
general equilibrium model outlined above, in which a central bank chooses to commit,
and see whether it can match the broad characteristics of US data. As seen above,
there is still a lack of consensus on the importance of backward looking behavior on
the agent’s decision behavior. Similarly, and because persistence might mistakenly
be attributed to serially correlated shocks alone, another goal of the paper is to
examine the quantitative importance of lagged terms on the structural relationships
of the model. Finally, we estimate the importance of policy commitment in aﬀecting
persistence.
The standard model is shown to be a reasonably good description of the 1987-
1999 period when the central bank is assumed to commit to a rule. On the whole,
the persistence properties of the output and the interest rate are well reproduced,
but the model generates slightly lower inertia in inﬂation than observed. Modelled
output and inﬂation volatilities are close to their empirical equivalent. Interest rate
3Except for the assumed pricing mechanism.
3volatility is however somewhat lower than in the data. Controlling for lagged terms
in our model structural equations reveals that the backward looking behavior is not
important if the central bank follows an optimal rule. Moreover, we ﬁnd that an
optimal commitment policy has a important role in generating large and persistent
eﬀects on output. However, this type of policy implies that in reaction to a supply
shock, the central bank is willing to let output stay below its target level for a long
period of time. Hence, it will generate a faster fall in inﬂation followed by a slight
(but long lasting) undershooting of the inﬂation target: thus, inﬂation persistence
is slightly lower than in the discretionary policy case. Finally, adding a smoothing
parameter to the policy rule followed by the central bank is not necessary to reproduce
the observed interest rate volatility and persistence.
In the next section, we brieﬂy describe our framework and discuss how optimal
commitment policy might induce inertia. We explore more in detail the persistence
generating mechanism in section 3. We present our empirical methodology and the
results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Standard Model
In order to preserve the generality of our argument, we specify a framework that is
now fairly standard in the literature. Following Walsh (2003), we consider a standard
small scale New Keynesian economy in which prices are staggered à la Calvo, and the
production function is linear in labour.4 The price setting behavior is derived as the
product of optimization by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms subject to constraints
on the frequency of the price adjustment. Moreover, Calvo’s partial adjustment
rule stipulates that each period ﬁrms are allowed to adjusts their price with a ﬁxed
probability 1 − ω. The central equations of our model economy are as follows:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κmct + εs,t, (1)
yt = Etyt+1 − 1/σ(i2t − Etπt+1) + εd,t, (2)
i2t = it − εi,t, (3)
mct = (σ + η)yt, (4)
εs,t = ρsεs,t−1 + ξs,t, εd,t = ρdεd,t−1 + ξd,t, εi,t = ρiεi,t−1 + ξi,t. (5)
4The main diﬀerence with Walsh (2003) is that in our setup, we add a shock to interest rate to
the aggregate demand equation. In contrast, Woodford (2003) uses an interest rate shock, but has
no preference shock as deﬁned below.
4β < 1 is a subjective discount rate and κ =
(1−ω)(1−βω)
ω > 0 is interpretable as a price
ﬂexibility parameter. For instance, as the probability of adjusting price increases, so
does κ. σ > 0 measures the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption while η > 0 measures that of labor supply. πt is deﬁned as the inﬂation
rate, yt the output gap, deﬁned as the distance between the actual and natural level of
output i.e. the output that would prevail if prices were fully ﬂexible; mct is the devi-
ation of real marginal cost from its steady state level and it is the nominal short term
interest rate expressed as a deviation from its steady state value.5 Equation (1) is the
Phillips Curve resulting from Calvo’s pricing rule; it describes the price adjustment
mechanism and is akin to a traditional AS supply curve except for its forward looking
component. Equation (2) represents the forward looking IS curve and can be derived
from the traditional Euler condition along with the assumption that no investment is
present in our closed economy model, so that consumption equals output. Equation
(3) describes the relation between the central bank control variable it, and i2t, deﬁned
as the nominal rate relevant to the economy. The latter can deviate from the interest
rate set by the monetary authority up to a stochastic component, εi,t.6 This type of
behavior is widely believed to be consistent with real policy practice. For instance,
in recent years, the US monetary policy has been conducted by controlling the Fed
fund rate.7 Under the assumption that labor market is competitive and output is
linear in labor, a linear relation between real marginal cost and the output gap, as
described by (4), emerges.8 εd,t is a shock to current demand and may be interpreted
as a preference shock.9 Steinsson (2003) and Ireland (2004) provide some theoreti-
cal foundations to the presence of a shock term in the Phillips curve. Both present
models were the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good is assumed to be
time-varying. In a monopolisic setup, and under the assumption that prices are fully
ﬂexible, price will be set equal to a markup above nominal marginal cost.10 Since the
markup is function of demand elasticity, the representative ﬁrm faces time varying
monopoly power.11 We can thus interpret εs,t as a disturbance to the ﬁrm’s desired
markup. Throughout the paper, we refer to εs,t as a ‘cost push’ shock, as deﬁned
in Galí et al. (1999). Finally, ξj,t , where j = [i,d,s], are uncorrelated innovations,
5This steady state value is sometimes refered to as being the natural rate of interest, which is the
rate compatible with a natural level of output (hence a zero output gap). Throughout our analysis,
this rate is assumed to be constant.
6It can be interpreted as a shock to money demand or as a shock to the natural rate of interest.
7On the characterization of the Federal Reserve policy, see for example Goodfriend (1991) or
Erceg and Levin (2003).
8We avoid the modelisation of the labor market which is somewhat diﬃcult and controversial in
order to preserve simplicity of exposition and focus on our primary interest.
9Ireland (2004) shows formally how such shock can be derived from a New Keynesian model
microfoundations.
10In addition, we only consider representative ﬁrms, so that all ﬁrms will set the same price when
they can adjust. The real marginal cost is expressed as the inverse of the markup.
11Whenever the probability of adjusting prices is lower than one, the actual markup will diﬀer
from the desired one.
5normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation given by σj(ξ).
2.1 Monetary Policy
The problemof monetary policy is formulated as an optimal response to shocks hitting
the economy. Assume furthermore that the monetary authority behaves optimally
according to a targeting rule. Suppose for instance, that the central bank seeks to


















, for i ≥ 0.
λ represents the weight the central bank places on output gap stabilization and χ
the weight placed on inﬂation stabilization. π∗ and y∗ represent the target variables.
We will assume that the target level for inﬂation is normalized to zero, while that
of output is given by the natural level. The target for the output gap is thus also
zero. For a standard sticky price economy such as ours, Woodford (2003) shows
formally how the deviations of the expected discounted utility of the representative
agent around the steady state level of utility are approximated by the above loss
function.12
In what follows, two diﬀerent assumptions about monetary policy behavior will be
discussed: discretionary and commitment policy. The fundamental diﬀerence between
these approaches lies in the central bank’s ability to make a credible promise about
its future actions. It will turn out, as presented more formally in the next section,
that this distinction is crucial for the equilibrium dynamics of the model economy
and its persistence properties. In addition, such distinction will enable us to isolate
the overall eﬀect commitment policy has on inertia.
2.2 Analytical Solutions
We present below the solutions under both discretionary and commitment policy.
As in Walsh (2003), we use the Minimal State Variable (MSV) solution approach
introduced by Mc Callum (1999b). Since our model economy is very similar to Walsh
(2003) and Woodford (2003), derivations of the ﬁrst order conditions and equilibrium
dynamics are left to the appendix.13
12With a positive inﬂation target (6) can be simply viewed as the representation of the central
bank’s preferences. These may then not be compatible with welfare maximizing objectives.
13More precisely, our equilibrium path for inﬂation and output are identical, while that of the
interest rate slightly diﬀers from these authors.
62.2.1 Discretion
In order to better understand why a central bank might be willing to introduce
some inertia in its response to shocks, it is useful to ﬁrst present the situation in
which the monetary authority acts on a discretionary basis. Because the decisions
of the central bank are not binding for the future, and thus cannot aﬀect agent’s
future expectations, discretionary policymaking requires that optimization takes place
period by period taking initial conditions as given.14 Accordingly, using the law of











+γt(yt − yt+1 + 1/σ(it − πt+1) − 1/σεi,t − εd,t)





where γt and ϕt are the Lagragians associated to the constraints, and ψ = κ(σ + η).
As already said, the central bank’s control variable is the short term interest rate it.
This control over it enables the monetary authority to set whatever short term rate it
chooses, given optimal paths for πt, in order to satisfy equation (2) above and achieve
the desired value of yt. As a consequence, the IS curve imposes no constraints on






This condition describes the optimal targeting rule under discretionary policy. The
central bank, by adjusting its instrument, ensures that that the target criterion (8)
is satisﬁed at any time. This rule corresponds to the well known ‘lean against the
wind’ policy, whereby a central bank contracts demand whenever inﬂation is above
target. Suppose the central bank becomes more concerned about output volatility
through an increase in λ, then for a given deviation of inﬂation from its target (here,
zero), equation (8) tells us that it will let output react with a smaller magnitude,
therefore decreasing output volatility.16 The same will happen if prices become more
sticky (ψ decreases). In this case, the central bank acknowledges that prices will
adjust more slowly, so that inﬂation will return back to its target more slowly. For
a given initial deviation of inﬂation from its target value, this means that a more
persistent deviation from the target value will increase overall inﬂation volatility.
Since the central bank reacts on a period by period basis, for inﬂation to return to
its targeted value, output will need as well to deviate for a longer period of time from
its target value. In addition, the central bank policy preferences (trade-oﬀ) does
not change, hence it will accept an increase in inﬂation volatility only if the overall
14We are ignoring the possibility of reputational equilibria.
15This would not be true in case there are restrictions or costs attached to the variation of interest
rates.
16The same reasoning applies to a decrease in χ. What matters here is the relative preference
shift of the monetary authority.
7output volatility decreases, i.e. output will deviate to a lower extent from its mean
target value of zero in each period as reﬂected in (8). Replacing this policy rule in
the structural equations yields the equilibrium output and inﬂation :
yt = e εs,t, and πt = f εs,t.
where e = −
χψ
λ[1−βρs]+χψ2 < 0, f = λ
λ[1−βρs]+χψ2 > 0. The equilibrium short term
interest rate is
it = g εs,t − εi,t + σεd,t,
where g = ρsf − (1 − ρs)σe. Note from this equation that the equilibrium nominal
interest rate varies in order to exactly compensate any demand shock (that is, either
εi,t or εd,t). Given that the monetary authority enjoys full credibility, and given that
it entirely compensates any demand shock, the only reason for inﬂation and output
to deviate from the targeted values is to face a ‘cost push’ shock which will generate
a trade-oﬀ in the policy objective and thus allow for a temporary deviation of both
inﬂation and output from targeted values. Equilibrium output and inﬂation dynamics
are thus solely depending on ‘cost push’ shocks and the only source of persistence
pertains exclusively to the shock process itself.17 Accordingly, the pricing mechanism
itself does not play any role in generating persistence. Reacting on a period by period
basis, the central bank cannot manipulate private sector’s expectations. This explains
why neither structural rigidity parameters nor policy objectives parameters do play
any role in aﬀecting inﬂation persistence in this case.
2.2.2 Commitment
In this case, the central bank makes a stand as to its current and future behavior and















+γt+j(yt+j − yt+1+j + 1/σ(it+j − πt+1+j) − 1/σεi,t+j − εd,t+j)










(yt − yt−1). (10)
This equation reﬂects the fact that the central bank wishes to implement a rule
that links inﬂation to variations in the output gap.18 This type of policy response










18The initial period (t = 0) targetting rule implies an identical behavior to the one obtained under
discretionary policy.
8reﬂects what Woodford (2003) calls history dependence of policy. By not making any
commitment about future actions, a discretionary policymaker cannot, by deﬁnition,
aﬀect private sector expectations. Hence, the optimal response under discretion is to
reduce yt and then let future output gap values revert back to trend as inﬂation falls
back to target. On the other side, making a commitment about current and future
policy allows the central bank to directly manipulate private sector expectations. As
apparent from equation (10), whenever actual inﬂation is above target value, the
output gap is expected to decline.19 Since inﬂation today depends on future output
gap values, this has the immediate eﬀect of dampening inﬂation.20 Also, the central
bank may then take advantage of this future dependence and manage to reduce the
initial impact on inﬂation. But for the central bank to be able to bring exactly this
kind of dynamic responses, it needs to make sure that the private sector will indeed
understand but also believe in this policy. The central bank can credibly commit,
hence manipulate expectations, when it calls on past economics conditions, which
in turn depends on past policy actions. It is in this sense that monetary policy
introduces history dependence. Accordingly, the monetary authority reacts not only
to current ‘cost push’ shocks, but also to past shocks. Furthermore, past output gaps
now aﬀect current output gap and inﬂation.21 The impact of variations of λ and ψ on
policy rule (10) is very similar to that discussed in the discretionary case. The only
diﬀerence lies in the fact that following a deviation of inﬂation from its target, it is
the diﬀerence in output gap that will adjust to bring inﬂation back to target instead
of the output gap level. Since such variations will alter the relationship between
inﬂation and past output gap, both λ and ψ are critical to the determination of the
policy induced persistence in the model. Equilibrium output and inﬂation are given
by:





2λβ > 0, b = −
χψ
λ[1+β(1−a−ρs)]+χψ2 < 0, c =
λ
χψ(1 − a) > 0, and d = λ
λ[1+β(1−a−ρs)]+χψ2 > 0. The equilibrium interest rate is now
given by:
it = Ωyt−1 + Γεs,t − εi,t + σεd,t,
19Similarly, an inﬂation rate below target value will require the central bank to let the output gap
grow through time.
20We will see that this means commitment achieves a better outcome in terms of (6).
21In Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), the authors ﬁnd a rule under commitment policy that
is very similar to equation (8), except that the coeﬃcient on output is bigger. In their paper,
Clarida et al. (1999) restrict the class of rules under analysis to the general form that arises under
discretion and look for the optimum within this class of rules. Put diﬀerently, they constrain the
policymaker to react only to contemporaneous supply shocks. They ﬁnd that, conditional on the
class of rules considered, that reaction to inﬂationary pressures is bigger under the commitment
case. The diﬀerence is that they do not consider a global (unconstrained) optimum.
9where Ω = a[σ(a − 1) + c] and Γ = [σb(a + ρs − 1) + (cb + ρsd)]. As long as a > 0,
inertia in the interest rate, inﬂation and the output gap is now present. Thus, in the
case of commitment, the monetary authority introduces a separate and independent
channel through which inertia might arise. This is true even if there is no inherent
source of persistence in the model i.e. if ρs = 0. Because the central bank lets
past output aﬀect current inﬂation through (10), price stickiness as well as policy
preferences have a role to play in determining the persistence properties of inﬂation,
output, and the interest rate. Note that the parameter a refers only to the fact that
the central bank commitment implies dependence upon past economic conditions as
reﬂected by the presence of lagged output gap (i.e. a is zero under discretionary
policy).
We have seen in this section that a unique stable MSV equilibrium exists under
both optimal discretionary and commitment policy. Our assumptions presuppose
that the monetary authority is able to enforce either (8) or (10) in order to reach its
desired objective without explicitly specifying its implementation through an interest
rate setting rule. This issue will however not be considered in our presentation since
it is extensively discussed in Woodford (2003).
3 Inertia and the role of policy commitment
While the dynamics of the New Keynesian model have been already widely studied,
we do not have, to our knowledge, studies focusing on the structural characterization
of inertia due to policy alone (i.e. inertia as a function of the model’s structural
parameters). The presence of commitment and the related concept of history depen-
dence aﬀect the inertial properties of the macro variables. We have seen that such
properties will not remain unaltered if, for example, the monetary authority becomes
more averse to inﬂation volatility or if prices become more ﬂexible. Thus, it might
be interesting to know how structural parameters determine inertia in the presence
of commitment. We propose ﬁrst to characterize the endogenous variable’s paths
following a supply shock (the only shock involving a trade-oﬀ in the policy objective
function). We address then the issue of structural inertia analysis by looking at the
model’s autocorrelation functions of inﬂation, output and the interest rate.
103.1 Impulse responses
In this section, we compute the theoretical impulse responses under commitment to a
‘cost push’ shock resulting from the solution above.22 We obtain for the output gap:
IRF
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, for n ≥ 1.
The inertial properties of the output gap process are entirely determined by the
evolution of λ,χ, ψ, and ρs.23 The impulse response simply tells us that the higher
a, the higher the inertia in the output gap process. Furthermore, there is no need
for ‘built in’ inertia within the shock process to generate gradually decaying impulse
responses. Thus, commitment generates an ampliﬁed (b > e, since a > 0) and more
persistent output response with respect to the case of discretionary policy. In the
next section, we will discuss in more detail how deep structural parameters alter a.
The impulse response for inﬂation is:
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y,εs(n − 1) + dρ
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s, for n ≥ 1.
Finally, the impulse response of the interest rate is given by:
IRF
c

















y,εs(n − 1) + Γρ
n
s, for n ≥ 1.
The inertial properties of inﬂation and interest rate following a supply shock depend
on the persistence parameter of the supply shock as well as policy preferences and
price ﬂexibility through the parameter a. Since we are interested in isolating the mon-
etary policy eﬀect on the variables dynamics, we present below the impulse response
to a supply shock that would arise if supply shocks to the economy were i.i.d.:
22Because of the compensation by policy of any demand shock, output and inﬂation only react
to supply shocks. The compensation operates through interest rate movements. This can be seen





d respectively. Note that both are indentical under
discretionary or commitment policy regime.
23Recall that the ﬁrst three structural parameters determine a. Note that although the same
parameters also enter in b, the latter only has an initial level eﬀect on the impulse response function.
11IRF
c
0,y,εs(n) = b0, for n = 0,
= b0a
n, for n ≥ 1.
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0,y,εs(n − 1), for n ≥ 1.
Where subscripts 0 denote parameter values accounting for ρs → 0. Through the
presence of policy commitment, inﬂation and interest rate impulse responses follow-
ing a supply shock are now entirely determined, up to a scaling factor, by the output
gap impulse response from the previous period (for n ≥ 1). Under discretionary and
commitment cases, we have plotted in Figure 1 the impulse response functions of out-
put, inﬂation and the interest rate following a supply shock. Parameter values are set
to: ψ = 0.05 , λ = 0.2 , ρs = 0.3 , σ = 2, and β = 0.99. Finally, we set χ = 1 so that
λ can readily be interpreted as the relative weight a central bank places on output
stabilization. Similarly, in order to visualize the impact of the sole monetary policy
commitment eﬀect, the ﬁgures present the impulse responses under the assumption
of i.i.d supply shocks (labelled ‘MP induced’). Inﬂation’s impulse response display an
initial positive impact that gradually declines and turns into a long lasting deﬂation-
ary episode (undershooting of inﬂation target) before going back to its initial value.
Also, the supply shock generates an immediate fall in output as expected from policy
rule (10). If the central bank precommits to a given policy rule, it will keep output
below its potential level for several periods after the shock. This is achieved by an
immediate raise in the interest rate that progressively decrease and turns into a long
lasting but small decrease in the interest rate. Private agents understand this and
believe that the central bank will indeed do so, and thus will incorporate this fact
into their current expectations about inﬂation. Future expected inﬂation is lower and
a slight deﬂation is induced.24 Note that if the supply shock is not serially correlated,
24On the other hand, inducing a small undershooting of the target inﬂation rate in the case of
discretionary policy is not credible for private agents because after the initial shock, the agents
understand that the central bank only reacts to contemporaneous output gap movements and con-
sequently is not willing to induce ‘undershooting’ in the future. That it why this type of policy is
considered as suboptimal with respect to commitment. In the literature, this relative ineﬃciency
has been termed the stabilization bias (see Woodford (2003) for example).
12so that all persistence in the model stem from policy commitment alone, the interest
rate does not increase initially. Knowing that the shock will die out next period, an
initial negative impact of the supply shock on the output gap is suﬃcient to gener-
ate expectations of a deﬂation during the following period, so that the central bank
might simply dampen the deﬂationary eﬀect by slightly (and initially) lowering the
interest rate. The possibility that a positive serially correlated supply shock might
keep future inﬂation above its targeted value implies a positive and stronger interest
rate response.
In order to clarify the way interest rates aﬀect endogenous variables, note that
despite the fact that the central bank uses the current short term interest rate as
its instrument, output and inﬂation also respond to variations in the future short
term rates rates. Accordingly, we ﬁrst rearrange and iterate equation (2) forward to
obtain:
yt = Ety∞ − 1/σ
∞ ￿
j=0








where Ety∞ can be interpreted as the long run output gap under the policy regime in
question. Assuming that this long run output gap equals its targeted value of zero,
we can see that aggregate demand, not only depends on current short term rates,
but on expected future rates as well. As seen earlier, because of policy commitment,
a channel through which private sector expectations are aﬀected by current policy
actions is introduced. Clearly then, the way in which commitment policy should alter
inﬂation and output dynamics runs mostly through the private sector’s expectations
about future interest rates. Such exact relationship may sound somewhat unrealistic,
but one should not forget that our setup allows for deviations from the central bank
controlled interest rate, as represented by shocks on the monetary control variable.
Besides, the fact that the private sector eﬀectively anticipates future movements in
the monetary instrument is both intuitive and realistic.25 As shown in (11), small
but persistent change in current short term rate can inﬂuence future interest rates. If
agents believe that moderate adjustments of short rates could have a signiﬁcant and
credible impact on future ones, achieving a given stabilization goal without inducing
too much volatility in the short term rates would seem possible. Hence, compared
to a discretionary policy case, the central bank’s impact on interest rates will lessen
after a given shock, because private agents understand and believe that it can take
advantage of its possibility to aﬀect future outcomes. Accordingly, the central bank
manages to smooth the interest rate movements so that stabilization of inﬂation and
output achieves better results in terms of equation (6).
25As an alternative interpretation, one may think also of an implicit term structure that links
short to long term rates through future expected short term rates values.
133.2 Persistence
In the appendix, we derive the autocorrelation functions for yt = ayt−1 + bεs,t, πt =
cyt−1+dεs,t , and it = Ωyt−1+Γεs,t−εi,t+σεd,t respectively. In this section, we focus
on the persistence of the variables represented by the ﬁrst order autocorrelations.
















































{b2Ω2 [ρs + a] + Γ2ρs (1 − a2)(1 − aρs)
+bΩΓ[(ρ2
s + 1)(1 − a2)]}σεs(0)





[Ω2b2 (1 + aρs) + Γ2 (1 − a2)(1 − aρs) + 2bΩΓρs (1 − a2)]σεs(0)
+(1 − a2)(1 − aρs)(σεi(0) + σ2σεd(0))
￿−1
Note that output and inﬂation persistence are independent of the shocks’ volatility,
while that of interest rate depends on σεs(0), σεi(0) and σεd(0). This should come
as no surprise. As a matter of fact, since we know that demand shocks are entirely
compensated by variations in the interest rate under the optimal policy, output and
inﬂation are left unaﬀected.
What is the amount of inertia induced by commitment policy? In the general case
where shocks are assumed to be serially correlated, it is relatively easy to identify the
source of persistence stemming from policy commitment alone. If policy is discre-
tionary, the equilibrium outcome only depends on shocks the only source of inertia
present in the model. Comparing the persistence properties of this equilibrium with
those obtained under commitment (for the same structural parameter values), allows
us to identify the contribution of policy to overall persistence.26 In the limiting case
where all shocks are i.i.d.(i.e. ρj → 0, for j = s,d,i), we can interpret the auto-
correlation functions for both yt and πt as arising exclusively from monetary policy




y(1) = a (12)
26From equilibrium solutions above, we have in the discretionary case: ρd
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[b2Ω2a + bΩΓ(1 − a2)]σεs(0)
[Ω2b2 + Γ2 (1 − a2)]σεs(0) + (1 − a2)(σεi(0) + σ2σεd(0))
(14)
where Γ0 , b0 < 0 and d0 > 0 denote respectively Γ, b and d with ρj → 0. We move
next to the ability of several structural parameters to alter inertia in the model.
3.3 The role of policy preferences and price ﬂexibility when
commitment is the only source of persistence
We have displayed in Figures 2 to 9, reduced form parameters a,b0,c,d0,Ω and Γ0
and theoretical output gap, inﬂation and interest rate persistence (still deﬁned as
the ﬁrst lag correlation) under the assumption that shocks are i.i.d..27 We let λ and
ψ vary within [0.01;0.6] and [0.01;0.2] respectively. As it can be seen from Figure
2, the autoregressive parameter a, which also represents output gap persistence, is
increasing in λ and decreasing in ψ. Recall from equation (10), that as λ approaches
zero, there is no role left for output stabilization and consequently no role either
for responding to past shock. That is why, on impact, a small but positive λ takes
us away from a ‘corner solution’ and increases output persistence drastically. By
deﬁnition, with i.i.d. shocks, the parameters b0 and d0 only govern the initial level
impact after a supply shock. Figures 3 and 5 show that b0 is decreasing (in absolute
value) and d0 increases whenever the central bank increases its aversion toward output
variability or prices become more sticky. While this result is fairly intuitive in the
case of variations in λ, variations in ψ imply somewhat subtler dynamic responses
in equilibrium. Both results reﬂect partly our discussion about the implementation
of the targeting rule.28 The slight diﬀerence results from the distinction between a
comparative analysis with respect to a given shock and a given deviation of inﬂation
from its target value. Consider for instance a decrease in ψ. As prices become more
sticky, inﬂation should fall back on its target value more slowly. We have seen that
this implies that the central bank will let output remain below its target value for
a longer period of time. Knowing this, what should ﬁrms do in response to a given
supply shock? In our setup, the ﬁrm is forward looking and sets its price taking into
account all future expected movements in the output gap.29 Since ﬁrms expect that
the output gap will remain below its trend for a longer period of time, the ﬁrms that
27We keep the same values as before for the remaining structural parameters, i.e. σ = 2, χ = 1
and β = 0.99.
28We also discuss this below when plotting impulse response functions for an altenative λ and ψ.
29This can easily be seen by iterating equation (1) forward. Remember that in our setup the
marginal cost is a linear function of the output gap.
15are able to adjust their price in the initial period will respond by increasing their
price more strongly to compensate for future decreases in inﬂation due to negative
output gaps. This is why inﬂation increases more on impact if prices are more rigid.
Hence d0 increases. The central bank is still willing to tolerate such increase in
inﬂation by mitigating it with a smaller initial shock on the output gap (b0 decreases
in absolute value). As it is apparent from Figure 4, for a given level of price rigidity,
the contribution of past output gap movements to inﬂation variability, as measured
by c, is always positive in λ. Price rigidity generally adds to output driven inﬂation
variability, but not always though. As one approaches full price rigidity, the central
bank is ready to let output stay below the target level for a very long period of time
after a shock, because ﬁrms have a reduced probability of adjusting their prices. This
eﬀect raises output driven inﬂation variability. We term this eﬀect ‘duration eﬀect’.
On the other side, a lower shock on impact occurs on the output gap process because
policy preferences did not change, and this relatively decreases output driven inﬂation
variability. We call this ‘magnitude eﬀect’. This shock is also smaller the higher the
preference for output stabilization because the central bank implicitly accepts more
inﬂation volatility. That is why c decreases faster in ψ the higher λ. Accordingly,
output driven inﬂation variability increases up to the point where the ‘duration eﬀect’
is outweighed by the ‘magnitude eﬀect’ as implied by the presence of monetary policy
commitment. Figure 6 shows that the contribution of past output gap movements to
interest rate variability, measured by Ω, can be either positive or negative depending
on λ and ψ. When preference for output stabilization is suﬃciently large, the interest
rate reacts positively to past output movements. This reﬂects a stronger stabilization
role of interest rates on output gap variations. On the contrary, as preferences shift
toward inﬂation stability, the interest rate may correlate negatively with past output
movements. The central bank may become so concerned about inﬂation volatility
that it accepts additional output gap volatility by letting the output gap to further
deviate from its target. As already shown by Figure 1 above, Γ0 is generally slightly
negative (see also Figure 7). However, if the monetary authority is strongly concerned
about inﬂation volatility (λ is low), then it might react positively to a supply shock.
Figure 8 shows that the ﬁrst lag theoretical inﬂation autocorrelation is always negative
but increasing in both λ and ψ. The central bank thus induces suﬃciently strong
negative correlation between output and inﬂation to undo the positive impact of
output serial correlation on inﬂation persistence. In other words, despite the fact
that the output process contributes positively to inﬂation inertia through c, the policy
response implying a target ‘undershooting’ might completely eliminate the previous
positive correlation, possibly reporting much of observed inﬂation persistence on the
supply shock correlation alone.
Finally, we wish to quantify the inertia in the interest rate that is due to commit-
ment policy alone. Since supply and demand shocks volatilities determine the level
of interest rate inertia, we need to specify their values. We set σεi(0) = σεd(0) = 0 to





b2Ω2a + bΩΓ(1 − a2)
Ω2b2 + Γ2 (1 − a2)
In the absence of demand shocks, the interest rate inertia would only depend upon
structural parameters and is independent of supply shock volatility. The resulting
interest rate inertia is illustrated by Figure 9. Interest rate persistence is, as for
inﬂation and output, increasing in λ and decreasing in ψ. However, the presence of
demand shocks is likely to decrease sharply commitment induced interest rate inertia.
We have also plotted interest inertia, as deﬁned by (14), in function of σεi(0) and
σεd(0) and let them vary within [0.01;1] (ﬁgure not presented here). To this end we
have set σεs(0) = 0.1, λ = 0.2 and ψ = 0.05. Results indicate that commitment
induced inertia remains positive but falls to negligible level (arbitrarily close to zero),
attributing much of the interest rate inertia as shock driven. We know that the central
bank entirely compensates any demand shock irrespective of any commitment to a
intertemporal policy rule. Hence, only the demand shock’s dynamics determines
the response of the interest rate. If demand shock volatilities increase relative to
that of supply shocks, interest rate inertia is largely dominated by the three shocks
persistence. If shocks persistence is brought to zero, we should expect interest rate
inertia to decrease, eventually reaching the zero bound.
To better understand the mere eﬀect of commitment on equilibrium dynamics
through ψ and λ when the economy faces a supply shock, we have plotted in Figures
10 and 11 the impulse responses of output and inﬂation for diﬀerent values of ψ and λ
(using the same parameter values set in Figure 1). By expressing λ relative to χ = 1,
we can identify λ and ψ as the two central parameters governing the dynamics of our
endogenous variables.
First, consider in Figure 10 the case where the central bank precommits and prices
become relatively inﬂexible (ψ = 0.01). The higher price rigidity requires output to
deviate from its target for a longer period of time in order to generate disinﬂation.
Because a reduced proportion of ﬁrms manage to adjust their price in each period, the
central bank knows it will take more time to aﬀect prices and hence inﬂation. Since
the policy preference parameter did not change, we know from our discussion about
Figures 3 and 5 that a bigger shock on impact aﬀect inﬂation while a smaller one
aﬀects output. In other words, the largest part of a given supply shock is absorbed
by inﬂation. The central bank will also increase interest rates in a more pronounced
way, both because the initial impact on inﬂation is bigger and because prices are more
sticky. Output persistence increases and, through the Calvo pricing mechanism, so
does inﬂation persistence. However, the stronger initial impact of the supply shock on
inﬂation is matched by a higher response in interest rate meaning that initial inﬂation
shoot-up is rapidly turning into a deﬂation as in Figure 1. This fall will certainly
decrease inﬂation persistence. However, as we have seen in Figure 8, this decrease
is not suﬃcient to decrease overall inﬂation persistence due to commitment (for the
same chosen parameter values). Interest rate inertia increases as well (Figure 9).
17Next, in Figure 11, we have pictured an increase in the parameter λ. In this case,
the monetary authority not only reduces its response to the initial shock on impact
but responds more strongly to variations in the output gap. Policy responses are
thus milder, in the sense that interest rate variations are dampened. This makes the
output gap more persistent. In turn, due to the Calvo pricing mechanism, price level
changes are reduced in response to smaller expected movements in output, implying
relatively more persistence in inﬂation, as conﬁrmed again by Figure 8.
4 Results
4.1 Econometric Methodology
The assessment of the model performance and the estimation of the structural pa-
rameters rely on the approach suggested by Söderlind (1999). Our model, and more
generally, any linear rational expectation model under optimal policy, can be inte-
















where x1t is a vector of n1 predetermined variables (x10 is given), x2t is a vector of n2
non predetermined variables (forward looking), ut a vector of k policy instruments








where xt = [x1t x2t]￿, and the matrix Q (symmetric) is a function of the structural
parameters. The solution to the above problem can be cast into a state space model
which can be directly estimated via maximum likelihood. The procedure is the fol-
lowing: A ﬁrst guess of the parameter vector is used in the solution algorithm. This
gives rise to a system of linear diﬀerence equations that can then be framed into a
state space model in which a Kalman Filter is then used to build up a likelihood func-
tion. We then iterate over the entire parameter space to ﬁnd the parameter vector
maximizing the likelihood.30 We use data found on the FRED database of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. It consists of quarterly data for the period from 1987Q4
to 1999Q4.31 The inﬂation rate is measured as the annualized quarterly change in
the GDP deﬂator and the output gap is the percentage deviation of real GDP from
30Given that data for three series are used, at least three shocks need to be speciﬁed in order to
avoid a singular covariance matrix when calculating the likelihood. The application to our bench-
mark model economy is brieﬂy discussed in the appendix.
31We choose this sample because it excludes the disinﬂationary period in the early 1980’s and is
characterized by a stable monetary policy regime.
18potential GDP as calculated by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce. Finally, the interest
rate is the annualized 3 month T-bill rate, which is calculated as the average of daily
rates (we use the deviation from the unconditional mean in our estimations). All
series are seasonally adjusted except for the 3 Month T-bill series (see Figure 12).
4.2 Model Estimation
Table 1 summarizes our estimation results under optimal commitment policy for the
system of equations as given by (1)-(6). Note that in all our estimations, we have
constrained χ = 1, so that λ is the weight the central bank places on output stability
relative to inﬂation. All our parameter estimates are found to be signiﬁcant. Our
estimate for β is slightly lower than conventional values but still well within theoretical
bounds. As is well known, the literature does not reach ﬁrm conclusions as to the
value of 1/σ. However, it is generally calibrated between zero and one depending on
the studies whereas 1/η is generally calibrated around 3. In our setup, σ is estimated
as being close to two and η near 0.5. Thus, our estimates can also be considered as
compatible with standard calibrated values. χ is estimated close to one, which is a
common assumed value in the literature. A value of 0.182 for λ suggest that the
Federal Reserve policy has responded to output gaps movements in a moderate way
throughout our period of analysis. This estimate is within usual values found in the
literature, which generally range between 0.1 and 0.25. Concerning the autoregressive
parameters of the shocks, we ﬁnd relatively persistent supply shocks (root of the
AR process is 0.697). Interest rate shocks are moderately persistent (0.522), while
preference shocks are very persistent (0.946). The value of ω, which reﬂects the
probability of leaving the price unchanged in pricing equation (1), implies that the
estimated average time between price changes is roughly six quarters. Concerning
the structural parameters of the Phillips curve, ψ = κ(σ + η) is estimated to be
approximately equal to 0.085. This ﬁgure stands in contrast with some previous
partial equilibrium results on the Phillips curve for the US when output gap is used
as the main driving variable of inﬂation.32 This suggests that a linear relationship
between the labor share and the output gap may well be a reasonable assumption.
Turning now to the reduced form solution parameter estimates, we have:
yt = 0.828 yt−1 − 0.887 εs,t (17)
πt = 0.369 yt−1 + 1.899 εs,t (18)
it = 0.025 yt−1 + 0.08 εs,t + 1.969 εd,t − εi,t. (19)
32For instance, Galí and Gertler (1999) ﬁnd a negative parameter estimate for the contemporane-
ous output gap.
19The autoregressive root for the output gap is quite large at roughly 0.828. This is
suggestive that the presence of commitment policy (through a) may indeed strongly
aﬀects the inertial properties of output. For the equilibrium inﬂation rate, we see that
the coeﬃcient on lagged output is estimated at 0.369, which implies that, due to the
presence of a commitment policy, a non negligible component of output variability
may be transferred to inﬂation. In the same time, the inﬂation rate reacts strongly
to shock variations (coeﬃcient is 1.899), this reﬂects the strong response of monetary
policy to inﬂation variability following ‘cost push’ shocks. The equilibrium interest
rate is only modestly aﬀected by the lagged output gap and ‘cost push’ shocks, more
so by both demand shocks (recall that these are exactly compensated by the central
bank). This indicates that the central bank only needs to make modest changes in
the interest rate to generate substantial movements in future output.
In Figure 13 are displayed the estimated impulse responses for inﬂation, the output
gap and the interest rate following a supply shock (using Table 1 parameter values).
The central bank increases slightly the interest rate for the ﬁrst 3 to 4 quarters, and
drives the output gap further down as it helps reducing the initial impact on inﬂation.
As the central bank slowly decreases the interest rate, inﬂation expectations are lower
and private agents expect a slight but long lasting undershooting of the inﬂation target
since the output gap only smoothly returns to its initial level.33 Using a smoothing
algorithm, we also have estimated the supply shocks that have hit the economy during
that period. The supply shock series is presented in Figure 14. The positive ‘cost
push’ shock period from the second quarter of 1990 to the end 1991 is probably due
to the burst of the war in Kuwait. In contrast, the end of the period is characterized
by negative ‘cost push’ shocks. We believe that throughout this very same period,
increasing industry competitiveness, mostly in technology intensive sectors, may have
indeed produced downward shocks to the desired markups.
4.3 The Importance of ‘Built in’ Inertia
Before addressing the issue of the quantitative contribution of monetary policy to the
overall persistence, we wish to discuss an important issue, still matter of considerable
debate. As a matter of fact, additional ‘built-in’ inertia such as backward looking
pricing behavior, is not included in our benchmark setup.34 Consequently, the only
33It is certainly defensible to contend that inducing a slight but long lasting deﬂation in response
to a supply shock is relatively unlikely to happen in the real world, even though our estimated
magnitude of deﬂation is small. After a supply shock, inﬂation peaks at roughly -0.2 after 10
quarters. Note however that the average inﬂation rate for the period 1987-1999 is roughly two
percent. If we consider that this number is suﬃciently close to the true target value over the
period and the model still is a good approximation in such ‘neighborhoods’, then the validity of the
argument might be attenuated. This would simply reduce inﬂation to 1.8 instead (i.e. a disinﬂation
would occur).
34The presence of a lagged inﬂation term on the right hand side of (1) is not necessarily reﬂective of
backward looking price setting. A standard rational forward looking “Taylor type” pricing contract
20sources of inertia arise fromcorrelated disturbances to the economy. However, because
other sources of inertia, stemming from private sector behavior, are not present in
our benchmark forward looking setup, we may mistakenly attribute variable dynamics
to correlated shocks whereas those are driven by other frictions not present in our
model economy. For example, several authors have argued that a lagged inﬂation
term should enter the forward looking Phillips curve which is unable to capture the
fact that inﬂation is highly persistent (see Fuhrer and Moore (1995)). A similar
justiﬁcation has been pointed out for the presence of a lagged output term in the
standard IS curve. The contribution of such inertial behavior can be evaluated by
specifying an aggregate supply and demand containing lagged terms. To this purpose,
we replace (1) and (2) by:
πt = β [αππt−1 + (1 − απ)Etπt+1] + κmct + εs,t,
yt = αyyt−1 + (1 − αy)Etyt+1 − 1/σ(i2t − Etπt+1) + εd,t.
The resulting model economy has been estimated under the assumption of an optimal
commitment policy. The results are presented in Table 2. Strikingly, virtually no
backward looking pricing behavior is detected. απ is very small and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. αy is found signiﬁcant and slightly higher at 0.047, but still very
small. As a consequence, other parameter estimates are left almost unaﬀected by
the presence of lagged terms in the Phillips and IS curves, suggesting that forward
looking behavior is predominant on both demand and supply sides. In a similar
setup, Ireland (2004) models the central bank behavior as a modiﬁed Taylor rule.
His results for the post 1980 period also show that lagged terms parameter estimates
are not signiﬁcant.35 In order to check for the stability of the results displayed in
Table 2, we present in Table 3 and 4 the estimations results constraining in turn
απ = 0 and αy = 0. If we force απ = 0, we ﬁnd negligible changes in the parameter
estimates. Only supply shock innovation volatility slightly increases. αy estimates
remain virtually identical, and the overall ﬁt is even slightly improved (as evident
from the LogLikelihood measure). In Table 4, we see that forcing the lagged output
term to zero slightly decreases the LogLikelihood of the model. The lagged inﬂation
parameter estimate is now higher, but still not signiﬁcant at a 5% conﬁdence level.
Our evidence thus suggest that frictions such as backward looking pricing behav-
ior should not alter signiﬁcantly the model variables, in particular their persistence
properties. Hence, we will rely on our benchmark, forward looking model economy
as a valid representation of the data. All in all, the inertia present in our economy
can be consistently attributed either to monetary policy or to correlated shocks in
the economy alone.
model yields precisely a Phillips curve in which lagged inﬂation terms appear.
35On the other hand, using optimal discretionary policy, Söderström et al. (2003) argue that
backward looking behavior is needed in the Phillips curve, but that the forward looking IS curve is
a good approximation of actual behavior.
214.4 Shocks vs. Policy Induced Persistence
In trying to assess further the model performance at replicating volatility and per-
sistence features of the data, we have computed some unconditional moments for
inﬂation, the output gap and the short term interest rate resulting from the esti-
mates obtained in Table 1.36 The results are presented in Table 5. The estimated
standard deviation for inﬂation is very close to that displayed by the data. The ﬁrst
autocorrelation is relatively close to its empirical counterpart and within a two stan-
dard errors band. Output persistence and volatility are well accounted for as they
lie generally within one standard error above the estimated moments of the data.
The unconditional moments for the short term interest rate are well reproduced. The
estimated volatility is however slightly lower. Accordingly, and contrary to what has
generally been argued, adding a term for a change in the interest rate in the central
bank’s objective function is not necessary to produce the low volatility found in the
data when the central bank is committed to a rule. Overall, the model performs rela-
tively well, but has diﬃculties at replicating the third lag autocorrelation in inﬂation.
In the same Table 5, we display moments estimated that are obtained when forcing
the supply shock persistence to alternative values, keeping other parameters from our
initial model estimation unchanged. We do this experiment for an intermediate value
of supply shock persistence (ρs = 0.3) and for a limiting economy where no other
source of persistence other than policy commitment induced is present (ρs = 0.001).
As persistence in the supply shock is decreased, inﬂation inertia falls turning into a
negative correlation as the model tends toward zero ‘built in’ persistence. This means
that policy commitment actually manages to induces a slight negative inﬂation cor-
relation. Consequently, the only source of positive serial correlation in inﬂation is
supply shock driven.37 Such a result was already anticipated when discussing Figure
8. The volatility in inﬂation also decreases the smaller ρs is. This is not surprising
since lower persistence means that ﬁrms will adjust initial prices to a smaller extent
because they anticipate that the shock will not propagate for long. This implies also
that the output gap will display lower volatility as the shock becomes less persistent.
Output persistence decreases slightly as the supply shock becomes less persistent, but
a substantial amount remains attributable to commitment policy alone. Concerning
the interest rate, we observe only marginal changes (at a 4 digit level generally) in
persistence and volatility as ρs decreases. Remember that in this case the interest
rate dynamics are also aﬀected by the two demand shocks the central bank is com-
pensating for. Following a supply shock, we already know that the interest rate reacts
very little. This happens to be true for any degree of persistence in the supply shock
so that most of the interest rate dynamics are due to the central bank compensating
36Note that all moments below and in successive tables could also be directly calculated from our
reduced form solution. To this purpose, we need to express the supply shock volatility in terms of
its innovation volatility. Since εs







t−i, we have σs(ε) =
σs(ξ)
1−(ρs)2.
37Interestingly, Ireland (2004) ﬁnds that, for the post 1980 period, the most important contributor
to movements in inﬂation is indeed the ‘cost push’ shock.
22for the demand shocks. Table 7 shows particularly well the interest rate persistence
and volatility for alternative values of persistence in the demand shock processes
keeping ρs to its estimated value (0.697). As it can be seen from those estimations,
once demand shock persistence is given lower values, most of the interest rate inertia
disappears. The volatility also drastically decreases as much of the dynamics are cut
oﬀ by the decrease in demand shock driven variability.38
Recall from our discussion in previous sections that if the central bank behaves
in a discretionary manner, it acts on a day to day basis, responding to contempora-
neous shocks only. The equilibrium outcome then implies no role for policy or for
price rigidity mechanism in altering the persistence properties of the model variables.
Thus, only exogenous shocks’ inertia is transmitted to output, interest rate and in-
ﬂation. Comparing the moments obtained under such hypothetical outcome helps
deﬁne the commitment policy contribution to persistence when ‘built in’ persistence
is still present through the serial correlation of shocks. Accordingly, the estimated
parameter vector presented in Table 1 is used to solve for the state space system
resulting from optimization under discretionary policy. The resulting unconditional
moments are displayed in Table 6. In this case, inﬂation persistence almost matches
that of the data. Model inﬂation is too volatile. On the contrary, output volatility
and persistence are too low. The same comment applies for the interest rate’s iner-
tial properties. As expected, the interest rate volatility is too high. Thus, for the
estimated structural parameter values under commitment, the main diﬀerences the
discretionary and the commitment policy are: higher inﬂation variability and per-
sistence, lower output gap volatility and persistence, and ﬁnally, higher interest rate
variability and lower persistence. A model estimated under discretion when supply
shock inertia decreases keeping other parameters constant is also provided. Since
output and inﬂation dynamics are entirely dictated by the supply shock, the per-
sistence properties entirely reﬂect those of the shock. Inﬂation volatility decreases
as ﬁrms post lower prices following a supply shock. Output volatility also decreases
as output fall following the shock is expected to be smaller and less persistent. In
the discretionary case, interest rate inertia increases and volatility decreases as the
supply shock becomes less persistent. The central bank needs to react more strongly
to supply shocks. As a matter of fact, it cannot exploit future expected movements in
the interest rates as under commitment; therefore less persistent shocks imply smaller
deviation of inﬂation and output from their target values and thus require less interest
rate movements, hence volatility decreases. Simultaneously, other shock persistence
do not vary and represent thus a bigger proportion of interest rate induced dynamics.
Since overall volatility decreases, the ﬁrst order autocorrelation increases slightly.
38One might be tempted to argue that the interest rate dynamics are too heavily depending on
serial correlation in demand shock. However, we think our speciﬁcation is reasonable in this context
since we have checked for the presence of lagged endogenous dynamics and found poor or little
empirical relevance. In addition, our high preference shock persistence estimate is realistic. Indeed,
changes in tastes can intuitively be considered as long lasting.
235 Conclusion
Implementing a commitment policy is welfare enhancing from a theoretical viewpoint.
However, we believe that commitment is not only a theoretically desirable feature, but
is also compatible with real world assumed policy goal and behavior by central banks.
Indeed, we have seen that a simple forward looking general equilibrium model can be
a reasonably good description of reality when the policy followed by the monetary
authority is a rule. Second, the presence of lagged terms in both Phillips and IS
curve is not empirically relevant, so that model inertia remain unaltered when these
variables are controlled for. Third, we have seen that a substantial part of output
persistence can be generated through a policyconcerned with variations in output, but
that commitment policy responses also involve two distinct eﬀects on inﬂation inertia:
i) A slight undershooting, implying relatively less inﬂation persistence, because the
central bank manages to reduce inﬂation faster; ii) A positive eﬀect, which reﬂects
the gradual return of inﬂation to its target from below. Since the former slightly
dominates, much of inﬂation inertia is reported to seriallycorrelated ‘cost push’ shocks
alone; iii) Interest rate inertia is mainly demand shock driven. One might be tempted
to argue that the interest rate dynamics are too heavily depending on serial correlation
in both demand shocks. However, we think that our speciﬁcation is reasonable in this
context since we have controlled for the presence of lagged endogenous dynamics and
found poor or little empirical support for their presence. In addition, and in our view,
a high preference shock persistence estimate is realistic. Indeed, changes in tastes can
intuitively be considered as long lasting.
Finally, we think a key point in our setup concerns the informational assumptions
made. For example, the central bank targets clear and ﬁxed inﬂation and output
goals. While this is a good ﬁrst approximation, it is likely that policy targets are not
always clearly pinned down by the private sector. One reason is simply because most
central banks do not target precise values. In that respect, the monetary authorities’
assumed credibility and the fact that agents have potentially access to all the available
information in the economy, including the central bank’s behavior is probably only
a good starting point. In a recent study, Erceg and Levin (2003) explore a model in
which the private sector faces a signal extraction problem about the central bank’s
targeted inﬂation value.39 Discussing the ‘Volcker’ disinﬂation period, these authors
show that the ‘transparency’ of the monetary policy regime also aﬀects considerably
inﬂation persistence properties. Alternatively, the central bank might have diﬃculties
in identifying whether a shock pertains to demand factors, supply, or a mix of both.
We should probably expect the latter situation to predominate in the real world.
Another point concerns the potential existing lags between a change in the interest
rates and its impact on output and inﬂation. It would be probably worth studying
how such lags would alter optimal policy, and consequently, the persistence properties
39Similarly, Ehrmann and Smets (2003) explore in a small model for the euro area, the implications
of incomplete information about potential output for the conduct of monetary policy.
24of real variables. Finally, if one is willing to accept that supply shock autocorrelation
is an acceptable feature of New Keynesian modelling, the forward looking behavior
that characterizes these models could well then be a good starting point for policy
evaluation analysis. In that case, further research should probably take into account
investment decisions both on ﬁrms’ and consumers’ sides.40
40Note however that Sveen and Weinke (2004) integrate capital (with adjustment cost) in a New
Keynesian model and ﬁnd very little diﬀerence in inﬂation dynamics: capital accumulation has
two counteracting eﬀects on marginal costs. On one side, an increase in aggregate demand increases
production and marginal cost. On the other, an increase in investment increases economic productive
capacity, thereby decreasing the marginal cost.
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The ﬁrst order conditions for it,πt and yt are respectively given by:
1/σEtγt = 0,
Et (χπt + ϕt) = 0,
Et (λyt − ψϕt) = 0.
Notice that the Lagrangian associated with the aggregate demand curve is always
equal to zero. As argued in the text, this simply states that equation (2) is irrelevant






The central bank can thus implement the behavior dictated by the ﬁrst order condi-




















To solve this equation, guess a solution of the form: yt = e εs,t. Since the shocks is
assumed AR(1), we have that Etyt+1 = ρs e εs,t. We then have:
e = −
χψ
λ[1 − βρs] + χψ
2.
Thus, equilibrium output and inﬂation are given by:
yt = e εs,t,
and
πt = f εs,t.
where f = λ
λ[1−βρs]+χψ2. The short term interest rate is now
29it = σ(Etyt+1 − yt) + Etπt+1 − εi,t + σεd,t,
= σ(−
ρsχψ
λ[1 − βρs] + χψ
2εs,t +
χψ
λ[1 − βρs] + χψ
2εs,t) +
ρsλ
λ[1 − βρs] + χψ
2εs,t − εi,t + σεd,t,
=
ρsλ + (1 − ρs)χψσ
λ[1 − βρs] + χψ
2 εs,t − εi,t + σεd,t.
6.1.2 Commitment
In this case the ﬁrst order conditions are given by:
1/σEtγt+j = 0, j ≥ 0,
Et
￿
χπt+j + ϕt+j − ϕt−1+j
￿





= 0, j ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst order condition for the start up inﬂation value (when j = 0) is χπt+ϕt = 0.
This introduces some inconsistency in the commitment approach. Note in particular
that at time t, the central bank would set πt = − 1
χϕt and promises then to set
πt+j = −1
χ(ϕt+j − ϕt+j−1) in the future. But when the central bank reaches period
t + j, it will prefer to set πt+j = −1
χϕt+j, as its optimization plan would suggest.
The timeless perspective approach, as deﬁned in Woodford (2003), circumvents this
problem by assuming that the optimal commitment policy has been chosen in the
past and that current values of inﬂation and output gap satisfy the second ﬁrst order
condition above. This means that we abstract from the initial condition above.41 To
rationalize this choice, we think of commitment as a policy regime that is eﬀective,
and understood by rational agents as such, for a suﬃciently long period of time before
initial conditions are set. We perceive this behavior as economically relevant for the




(yt − yt−1). (20)
Note that this equation holds also in realized values because when period t comes,
the central bank can observe by assumption both πt and yt. Using equation (20) back
in the Phillips Curve, we obtain an expectational linear diﬀerence equation for the











+ ψyt + εs,t,
41Hence, throughought the text, we will loosely speak of commitment as a timeless perspective
policy
42Mc Callum and Nelson (2000) argue for instance that commitment is convincing when one is
concerned with macroeconomic performance “...within and across [policy] regimes,....”.
30rearranging, we ﬁnally get:








Now conjecture a solution of the form yt = ayt−1 + bεs,t. Then, we have Etyt+1 =
a2yt−1 + (a + ρ)bεs,t. Plug this back in (21), the equation becomes:




)(ayt−1 + bεs,t) = β
￿
a






By rearranging, one ﬁnally gets,
￿
βa








β(a + ρs)b −
χψ
λ







The solution for b to the above equation is easily obtained as one gets,
b = −
χψ
λ[1 + β (1 − a − ρs)] + χψ
2.
Similarly, a unique solution for a is obtained by solving the equation βλa2 − (λ +
λβ + χψ
2)a + λ = 0, and imposing a < 1 for stability, which gives:
a =
λ + λβ + χψ
2 −
￿￿







By using the above solutions in our conjectured output gap dynamic equation and
plugging it back into (20), we obtain:
πt = cyt−1 + dεs,t, (22)
where c = λ
χψ(1 − a), and d = λ
λ[1+β(1−a−ρs)]+χψ2. Finally,




2yt−1 + (a + ρs)bεs,t − ayt−1 − bεs,t
￿
+ acyt−1 + (cb + ρsd)εs,t − εi,t + σεd,t,
= a[σ(a − 1) + c]yt−1 + [σb(a + ρs − 1) + (cb + ρsd)]εs,t − εi,t + σεd,t.
6.2 Autocorrelations
In what follows, we assume covariance stationarity of all variables. σy(k) denotes
cov(yt,yt+k) and σyεs(k) denotes cov(yt,εs,t+k).
31σy(0) = a
2 var(yt) + b
2var(εs,t) + 2ab cov(yt−1,εs,t)
= a
2σy(0) + b

























The last equality is obtained by noting that σyεs(0) = cov(yt,εs,t) = cov(ayt−1 +
bεs,t,εs,t) = bσεs(0)+cov(ayt−1,εs,t) = bσεs(0)+cov(ayt−1,ρsεs,t−1 +ξs,t) = bσεs(0)+
aρsσyεs(0). From our stationarity assumption, we have then σyεs(0) =
bσεs(0)































































































































c2b2 (1 + aρs) + d2 (1 − a2)(1 − aρs) + 2bcdρs (1 − a2)



















































































































s + ak−1)(1 − a2) +
￿k−1
j=1 ρj





In the case of the short term interest rate, we have:
σi(0) = Ω
2σy(0) + Γ











+ σεi(0) + σ
2σεd(0),
=
Ω2b2 (1 + aρs) + Γ2 (1 − a2)(1 − aρs) + 2bΩΓρs (1 − a2)
(1 − a2)(1 − aρs)
















































































































[Ω2b2 (1 + aρs) + Γ2 (1 − a2)(1 − aρs) + 2bΩΓρs (1 − a2)]σεs(0)
+(1 − a2)(1 − aρs)(σεi(0) + σ2σεd(0))
￿−1

     

















s + ak−1)(1 − a2) +
￿k−1
j=1 ρj
sak−1−j (1 − a2)(1 − aρs)
￿
}σεs(0)







     
     
6.3 The Model in State Space Form
First write:
x1t = [πt−1 πt−2 πt−3 πt−4 yt−1 yt−2 yt−3 yt−4 it−1 it−2 it−3 it−4 εi,t εs,t εd,t]
￿ ,














The model can then be written as




                                  

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρi 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρs 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρy 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
σ
1
βσ −1 − 1
βσ 1 + κ
βσ(σ + η)





B = [ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/σ ]
￿,
are the matrices containing the structural parameters of the model. We denote Σ￿
the covariance matrix of 3t which is diagonal, and xt+1 = [x1t+1 Etx2t+1]￿, 3t =
[ξt 0n2×1]￿.43
6.3.1 Solving under optimal policy
To solve the central bank optimization problem, ﬁrst recall that our central bank loss








where Q is a symmetric matrix. Since we assume the central bank is able to commit












t+1[Axt + But + 3t − xt+1]
￿
.
43The additional lags in y,π and i appearing in x1t are needed to calculated the unconditional
moments below.































This state space representation is estimated by transposing it into a Kalman Filter
framework used to build up the likelihood function of the data. Write the state space
model transition equation as
Xs,t+1 = M Xs,t + 3t. (25)
The measurement equation is,
Xm,t = C1 Xs,t, (26)
where Xs,t = [x1t φ2t]￿ and Xm,t = [x2t ut]￿ .45 Note that φ1t has disappeared from
the measurement equation since it does not add any useful information to the dy-
namics of the forward looking endogenous variables.46 At each guess of the parameter
vector, the solution algorithm gives an optimal policy rule and a system of linear
diﬀerence equations for the model variables i.e. our state space model. To obtain
unconditional moments of the state and endogenous variables simply write:
ΣXs = M ΣXsM
￿ + Σ￿,
and the solution is:
vec(ΣXs) = (I − M ⊗ M)
−1vec(Σ￿).
where ΣXs is the variance covariance matrix of the states. Finally, we have ΣXm =
C1 ΣXs C￿
1. A similar solution procedure can be applied under discretionary optimal
policy.47
44See Söderlind (1999) for details.
45In our estimated system, we add in the transition and measurement equation two vectors of
constants c and d respectively. Also a vector of shocks ηt is added to the measurement equation
(with covariance Ση).
46We thus eliminate the rows in C that are unnecessary. This yields C1.
47See Söderlind (1999) or Söderström et al. (2003) for an exposition.






























































38Table 5: Unconditional moments: Commitment48
Inﬂation Persistence ρ(1) Volatility σ
Estimated Data s.e.(Data) Estimated Data s.e.(Data)
ρs = 0.697 0.55 0.69 0.08 0.99 1.02 0.15
ρs = 0.3 0.19 0.49
ρs = 0.001 -0.09 0.36
Output Persistence ρ(1) Volatility σ
Estimated Data s.e.(Data) Estimated Data s.e.(Data)
ρs = 0.697 0.97 0.91 0.08 1.79 1.65 0.16
ρs = 0.3 0.90 0.52
ρs = 0.001 0.83 0.29
Int. Rate Persistence ρ(1) Volatility σ
Estimated Data s.e.(Data) Estimated Data s.e.(Data)
ρs = 0.697 0.94 0.96 0.07 1.20 1.50 0.19
ρs = 0.3 0.94 1.20
ρs = 0.001 0.94 1.20
48Tables 5,6, and 7 display both ﬁrst order autocorrelation and standard deviation. The standard
errors for the data series are calculated using bootstrapping techniques (200 sample replications).
39Table 6: Unconditional moments: Discretion
Inﬂation Persistence ρ(1) Volatility σ
Estimated Data s.e.(Data) Estimated Data s.e.(Data)
ρs = 0.697 0.70 0.69 0.08 1.64 1.02 0.15
ρs = 0.3 0.30 0.59
ρs = 0.001 0.001 0.41
Output Persistence ρ(1) Volatility σ
Estimated Data s.e.(Data) Estimated Data s.e.(Data)
ρs = 0.697 0.70 0.91 0.08 0.76 1.65 0.16
ρs = 0.3 0.30 0.28
ρs = 0.001 0.001 0.19
Int. Rate Persistence ρ(1) Volatility σ
Estimated Data s.e.(Data) Estimated Data s.e.(Data)
ρs = 0.697 0.79 0.96 0.07 2.00 1.50 0.19
ρs = 0.3 0.83 1.32
ρs = 0.001 0.86 1.26
Table 7: Unconditional moments: Commitment with ρs = 0.697
Int. Rate Persistence ρ(1) Volatility σ
Estimated Data s.e.(Data) Estimated Data s.e.(Data)
ρd = ρi = 0.3 0.30 0.96 0.07 0.42 1.50 0.19
ρd = ρi = 0.001 0.01 0.40
40Figure 1: Impulse Responses with ψ = 0.05 and λ = 0.2
41Figure 2: Parameter a (Output persistence)
Figure 3: Parameter b0
42Figure 4: Parameter c
Figure 5: Parameter d0
43Figure 6: Parameter Ω
Figure 7: Parameter Γ0
44Figure 8: Inﬂation Persistence
Figure 9: Interest Rate Persistence
45Figure 10: Impulse responses with ψ = 0.02 and λ = 0.2
46Figure 11: Impulse responses with ψ = 0.05 and λ = 0.6
47Figure 12: Data series 1987Q4-1999Q4
48Figure 13: Impulse Responses to a Supply Shock: Commitment Policy
Figure 14: Smoothed Estimate of Supply Shock
49